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I. INTRODUCTION
In Controlling Market Power in Telecommunications: Antitrust vs.
Sector-specific Regulation ("Controlling Market Power"), Damien Geradin
and Michel Kerf undertake the ambitious task of comprehensively
reviewing and analyzing the telecommunications regulatory structure of
five nations that have achieved some success in promoting competition in
telecommunications markets. The purpose of this undertaking is to evaluate
the use of telecommunications sector-specific regulation versus more
general, economy-wide antitrust regulation to accomplish specific goals
related to promoting competition and efficiency in the provision of
telecommunications services.
Controlling Market Power is a slow read, densely packed with
information about a broad range of telecommunications regulations in the
five countries analyzed. The discussion ranges from interconnection
obligations to retail and wholesale price regulation to spectrum auction
rules to universal service programs. In the course of this wide-ranging
analysis, the authors make a number of useful observations and
recommendations. But their overarching conclusions, concerning the ideal
division of telecommunications regulation between sector-specific rules
and institutions and antitrust-based rules and institutions, are simply too
broad to be of much use to policymakers or practitioners in countries that
already have well-established telecommunications regulatory models.
Despite its limitations, Controlling Market Power offers an important
lesson. Understanding the contributions and limitations of the comparative
analysis contained in the book helps to clarify the circumstances in which
comparative analysis of telecommunications regulations can serve as a
useful tool for the telecommunications policymaker or practitioner. That is,
where the circumstances and objectives of the countries are sufficiently
comparable, and the issue being analyzed is sufficiently narrow, much can
be learned by examining the experience of other countries that have already
undertaken regulatory activity designed to promote the relevant policy
objectives.1 This type of analysis often takes place as other countries look
to U.S. regulatory activity, but there also are a number of circumstances in
which U.S. policymakers and practitioners can benefit from analyzing
regulatory activity that has taken or is taking place in other countries.
Part II of this review describes the comparative analysis undertaken in
Controlling Market Power. To convey the scope and substance of the
analysis, this review summarizes (1) the criteria upon which Geradin and
1. In performing such a comparative analysis, it may be useful to keep in mind the
distinction identified in Controlling Market Power between approaches that rely on sector-




Kerf evaluate the various regulatory models they examine, (2) the
regulatory regimes analyzed and evaluated, and (3) the conclusions the
book derives from the comparative analysis. Part III discusses the
contributions to be made by-and the pitfalls encountered in-undertaking
the type of broad comparative analysis contained in Controlling Market
Power. Part III also offers a few suggestions about the circumstances in
which a comparative evaluation of different telecommunications regulatory
approaches can be most useful.
II. CONTROLLING MARKET POWER IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Controlling Market Power undertakes an ambitious and
comprehensive comparative analysis of five national telecommunications
regulatory regimes, evaluating the regimes in terms of their success in
meeting a list of policy criteria identified by the authors. Based on their
analysis, the authors make some specific regulatory recommendations and
reach a few broad conclusions about the effects of regulating
telecommunications through sector-specific versus antitrust-based
regulations and institutions. This Part summarizes the evaluative criteria,
the regulatory regimes analyzed, and the comparative analysis.
A. Criteria for Evaluating Telecommunications Regulatory Models
Controlling Market Power identifies seven criteria that serve as the
basis for evaluating the efficiency and efficacy of the various regulatory
models examined in the book. Although Geradin and Kerf acknowledge
that the list is not exhaustive, they assert that the identified criteria
represent "many of the most important features which regulatory models in
telecommunications should present."2 The criteria are:
1. Providing incentives to meet users' demands for efficient,
reasonably priced telecommunications services: Geradin and Kerf-and
the regulators in the countries they examine-see this as the overarching
goal of telecommunications regulation. Means for accomplishing this goal
include generating competition in the market, requiring providers to
compete for the market (such as through auctions), and directly regulating
prices and quality.
2. Specificity versus coherence: Telecommunications regulation
should strike an appropriate balance between addressing the specific
characteristics of the telecommunications industry while ensuring sufficient
coherence of the national economic regulatory framework as a whole.
2. DAMIEN GERADIN & MICHEL KERF, CONTROLLING MARKET POWER IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ANTITRUST VS SECTOR-SPECiFIC REGULATION 19 (2003) [hereinafter
CONTROLLING MARKET POWER].
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3. Flexibility versus certainty: Regulations and regulatory institutions
should have sufficient flexibility to adapt to changes in circumstances
while providing enough certainty to facilitate investment in
telecommunications services and providers.
4. Competent, impartial regulation: Regulators should be competent
to address and understand the issues. The system should be designed to
enable the regulators to resist "regulatory capture" by the regulated entities
or industries.
5. Regulatory accountability and stakeholder participation:
Regulators must be accountable, through means such as publication and
appellate review of reasoned decisions. Regulatory procedures must allow
interested parties to present their views before final decisions are made.
6. Benefits of regulation should outweigh their potential costs: Costs
include those borne by taxpayers, industry, and the economy as a whole.
7. Efficient allocation of regulatory resources: Regulatory institutions
should perform their functions effectively. The system should ensure that
regulatory decisions across institutions are consistent.
The book then summarizes the types of economic regulatory issues
the authors will address as they evaluate the various countries'
telecommunications regulatory regimes. The issues include regulation of
retail prices and interconnection prices, approaches used to promote
competition (such as facilities-based competition, resale, and unbundled
access to elements of the local network), methods for allocating scarce
resources like spectrum (including various auction methodologies),
universal service, vertical separation and integration, convergence within
communications and between the communications and information
technology industries, and international benchmarking of
telecommunications prices.
B. Description of Telecommunications Regulatory Models
The bulk of Controlling Market Power is devoted to describing and
analyzing the regulatory regimes and institutions of the five countries
evaluated: the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Chile,
and Australia. The authors chose these countries both because of the
relative success the countries have achieved in bringing competition to
their telecommunications markets and to show a continuum of regulatory
approaches ranging from very telecommunications sector-specific to very
antitrust-focused.
The organization of the comparative analysis is effective. The authors
begin with the two most extreme examples, the United States and New
Zealand, and then describe the more intermediate approaches taken in the
other three countries. Australia, discussed last, fits particularly well into the
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comparative analysis because Australian policymakers, who were
somewhat late to initiate efforts to promote telecommunications
competition, conducted a comparative investigation of other countries'
experiences before adopting a regulatory framework. The analysis of the
various regulatory regimes is thorough and for the most part accurate,
except that it unavoidably fails to reflect the (in some cases substantial)
developments in telecommunications regulation that occurred between the
writing and publication of the book.
1. United States
The comparative discussion begins with the United States, which has
the most sector-specific regulatory regime of the countries analyzed.
Regulatory efforts to minimize and control market power in U.S.
telecommunications markets center on the detailed 1996
Telecommunications Act ("the 1996 Act"), 3 which is part of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended ("the Act").4 The Act and its
implementing regulations are administered by the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), a powerful, highly competent, independent
regulatory body. The book describes the U.S. regime's local exchange
network unbundling obligations (and the related Total Elemental Long-Run
Incremental Cost ("TELRIC") pricing methodology); universal service and
access charge reform efforts; the 1996 Act provisions allowing the
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") to enter the long-distance
market only upon a showing that their own local markets are open to
competition; spectrum auction procedures; and proposals, being considered
primarily by state regulatory bodies, to require structural separation (actual
or functional) of the RBOCs into wholesale and retail entities. The book
also observes that antitrust laws are fully applicable to telecommunications
operators and that these laws often are enforced in the context of mergers
of telecommunications providers.
5
Controlling Market Power then applies its evaluative criteria to the
U.S. regulatory regime, making the following significant observations:
Competition and other efficiency incentives: Although Geradin and
Kerf generally favor measures that more directly encourage facilities-based
competition, they acknowledge the continued dominance of the U.S. local
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
4. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
5. But see Trinko v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir., 2002), cert. granted sub
nom. Verizon Comm. Corp. v. Trinko, 123 S. Ct. 1480 (2003), argued Oct. 14, 2003, a case
in which the RBOCs are seeking to establish that antitrust laws cannot be used where the
only violation supporting the antitrust claim is of the FCC's rules.
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exchange market by incumbent local exchange companies ("ILECs") and
recognize that "unbundling of the local loop may thus be a valid strategy to
stimulate competition and innovation in at least some cases." 6 On the other
hand, they criticize the TELRIC pricing methodology adopted by the FCC
to guide the pricing of unbundled network elements ("UNEs"), arguing that
TELRIC pricing may preclude ILECs from recouping their investments and
"is contrary to the language of the 1996 Act and thus illegal as has been
recently confirmed by a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Eighth
Circuit." 7 However, the Eighth Circuit decision was subsequently overruled
by the Supreme Court in Verizon Communications v. FCC, which found
that it was within the FCC's discretion to choose the TELRIC methodology
to promote competition as mandated by the 1996 Act.
8
Geradin and Kerf also criticize the 1996 Act's conditional grant of
long distance authority to RBOCs who can demonstrate that their local
markets are open to competition. Written when only a few Section 271
applications had been approved, the book argues that RBOCs have been
unenthusiastic about entering the long distance market (where revenues
have been shrinking) and that long distance providers have had an incentive
to stay out of the local exchange market to hinder the RBOCs' efforts to
make the competitive showing necessary to gain the right to compete in the
long distance providers' core business.9  To better promote local
competition, the book suggests that full structural separation of the
RBOCs' wholesale and retail businesses would reduce both the ability and
incentives of monopoly local providers to exclude competitors from access
to their local facilities. However, the authors acknowledge that this
6. CONTROLLING MARKET POWER, supra note 2, at 100.
7. Id. at 100 (citing Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), overruled in
relevant part sub nom. Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002)).
8. 535 U.S. 467, 508 (2002). The authors' reliance on a subsequently overruled court
case points out a significant (though unavoidable) weakness of Controlling Market Power-
or any book-length analysis of current regulatory activity in the telecommunications arena.
The constantly evolving regulation of telecommunications, combined with inevitable delays
between the writing and publication of a book, make it difficult to discuss current
telecommunications regulation in that medium. For example, Controlling Market Power
was published in 2003, but the most recent developments cited in the book occur in the
2000-2001 time frame. A number of significant regulatory developments occurred during
the intervening period.
9. CONTROLLING MARKET POWER, supra note 2, at 101 (footnotes omitted). Like the
comment concerning the legality of TELRIC pricing, this comment is woefully outdated, as
the RBOCs now have Section 271 authority in all 48 continental states and the District of
Columbia. See FCC, "News Release: Federal Communications Commission Authorizes
Qwest to Provide Long Distance Service in Arizona; Bell Operating Companies Long
Distance Application Process Concludes; Entire Country Authorized for 'All Distance'
Service," Dec. 3, 2003. Moreover, long distance companies like AT&T and MCI are among
the more active competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs").
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approach would be expensive to implement and would be hindered by
protracted legal challenges, "a factor that cannot be overlooked in the
particularly litigious [U.S.] system."'
10
The book also comments on the competitive status of the wireless and
Internet services markets. Geradin and Kerf note that the U.S. wireless
telecommunications market is increasingly competitive but characterized
by one of the lower penetration rates among industrialized countries, due in
large part to the "called party pays" pricing of wireless services. In the
Internet services market, high penetration and usage rates driven by flat-
rate local access charges raise concerns about congestion in the local
network. Geradin and Kerf believe this congestion can best be remedied by
encouraging adoption of broadband alternatives to dial-up Internet access.
With respect to universal service, the authors approve of recent efforts
to move toward explicit universal service support. However, they assert
that the lack of competition for universal service support may inflate U.S.
universal service costs, which are high by international standards.
Specificity versus coherence: Controlling Market Power contends that
the highly specific U.S. regulatory regime has some benefits but has
resulted in rigid regulatory distinctions between communications
technologies that are "poorly adapted to a context of convergence ...
Antitrust authorities or infrastructure-wide regulatory agencies, based on
the model of the state utility commissions, would.., be better positioned
to regulate converging industries."''
Benefits of regulation should outweigh their potential costs:
Significant regulatory costs are cited as a clear drawback of the U.S.
regulatory model. These costs include: (1) administrative resources
expended by both the FCC and state regulatory commissions; (2) carriers'
investment of internal and external legal resources to ensure compliance
with complex regulations; (3) costs created by regulatory inefficiencies,
including costs of judicial proceedings to resolve disputes regarding the
allocation of regulatory responsibilities between the FCC and state
regulators and the costs to the economy at large of delaying regulatory
reform while such disputes are resolved; and (4) costs of regulatory
mistakes, which have a tendency to increase with the number and
complexity of the rules. 12
10. CONTROLLING MARKET POWER, supra note 2, at 110.
11. Id. at 111.
12. The authors contend that Section 271 may have been one of these mistakes, perhaps
delaying the arrival of competition in the local exchange market by discouraging long
distance providers from playing a role in bringing competition to that market. As noted
supra note 9, this contention is based on an outdated assessment of the status of the RBOCs'
Section 271 applications.
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Efficient allocation of regulatory resources: The authors argue that
uncertainties and peculiarities in the allocation of responsibilities between
the FCC and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") in the Section 271 and
merger review processes generate harmful inefficiencies. The authors
believe that efficiency could be improved with more Congressional
guidance concerning the allocation of responsibility between the FCC and
state regulators, and by assigning primary responsibility for Section 271
approval and merger review to the DOJ, with input from the FCC. 13
Beyond applying their seven criteria for effective telecommunications
regulation, Geradin and Kerf do not make any overarching
recommendations concerning the U.S. telecommunications regulatory
model. General conclusions are saved for the final chapters of the book.
Controlling Market Power contains a similarly comprehensive review
and analysis of each of the other four countries the book examines. The
analysis of the U.S. regulatory model is described in some detail to provide
a sense of the scope and detail of the analyses. The analyses of the other
countries' regulatory regimes will be summarized more succinctly.
2. New Zealand
New Zealand represents the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum
from the detailed, sector-specific approach taken in the United States.
Initial efforts to liberalize the New Zealand telecommunications market
relied almost exclusively on general antitrust rules administered by the
antitrust authority. These rules include prohibitions on: (1) contracts or
arrangements that have the purpose or effect, or are likely to have the
effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market; (2) arrangements
to fix prices; (3) any use of a dominant position in a market to restrict entry
into, prevent or deter competition in, or eliminate any person from the
dominated market or any other market; and (4) the acquisition of assets or
stock that would likely give an entity a dominant position or strengthen an
entity's dominant position in a market. The Commerce Commission is
responsible for monitoring the application of antitrust regulations. It may
impose price controls in the interest of users, consumers, or retailers, and it
may authorize otherwise prohibited arrangements or transactions where the
benefits appear to exceed potential disadvantages.
13. Id. at 116-17. The authors acknowledge that the FCC is probably best qualified to
determine an ILEC's compliance with its Section 251 interconnection obligations, but they
also argue that "it is a competition authority such as the [DO J], with experience in assessing
the degree of competitiveness of different markets across the economy, which should be
entrusted with the task of determining whether the local [communications] market is
sufficiently open to competition." Id. at 116. Similarly, they contend that "it would be
preferable to concentrate merger review in the hands of the [DOJ] which has the advantage
of reviewing mergers across different fields of activity." Id. at 117.
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As of the early 1990s, only a few telecommunications-sector-specific
rules were in place in New Zealand. These included: (1) universal service,
financial disclosure, and interconnection obligations applicable to Telecom,
the newly privatized (but still partially state-owned) national
telecommunications service provider, and (2) a 1989 law authorizing the
Minister of Economic Development to grant (via auction) exclusive and
technology-neutral management rights to spectrum managers authorizing
them to manage (and issue licenses for the use of) nationwide spectrum
bands. Spectrum management rights and licenses are transferable, subject
only to the prohibition against the acquisition of assets that will create or
strengthen an entity's dominant position in any market.
By late 2000, the Minister of Communications (within the Ministry of
Economic Development) had determined that New Zealand's reliance on
general antitrust law to regulate telecommunications had been inadequate
in some respects. Soon the Telecommunications Act of 2001, containing a
number of new sector-specific rules, was adopted by the legislature.' 4 The
new rules include technical interconnection and pricing obligations
applicable to certain services (e.g., interconnection with fixed networks and
resale of retail services). Pricing is set based on international
benchmarking, subject to more precise application of the specified pricing
methodology on appeal. 15 The new rules are administered primarily by a
new Telecommunications Commissioner of the Commerce Commission,
sometimes with input from other commissioners.
Applying their evaluative criteria, Geradin and Kerf make the
following significant observations about the New Zealand regulatory
model: (1) although the application of general antitrust law has done much
to promote competition in telecommunications in New Zealand,
interconnection and number portability issues proved hard to resolve in the
absence of sector-specific requirements; (2) spectrum resale has not taken
place as expected, but this may be due to the small size of the New Zealand
market as opposed to problems with the design of the spectrum
management system; (3) relying on antitrust regulation (which places
significant decision-making power in the courts) can result in too much
uncertainty as contentious issues are resolved through sometimes long and
difficult judicial processes16; and (4) an absence of sector-specific rules can
result in substantial regulatory costs in the form of legal costs incurred in
14. Telecommunications Act, 2001 (N.Z.)
15. An international benchmarking exercise looks to similar prices in comparable
countries applying the specified methodology to similar networks.
16. Geradin and Kerf appear to assume, not necessarily correctly, that the time and costs
involved in resolving contentious issues through the courts will exceed the time and costs
involved in addressing such issues through the legislative and/or regulatory process.
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resolving disputes, economic costs resulting from the delay in resolving
contentious issues, and regulatory mistakes resulting from reliance on
courts lacking specialized expertise.
3. United Kingdom
Detailed sector-specific rules, set forth as conditions to each
telecommunications carrier's Public Telecommunications Operator
("PTO") license, govern the provision of telecommunications services in
the United Kingdom. The conditions of the standard PTO include a
requirement to provide number portability, a financial disclosure obligation
applicable to companies that have special rights to provide services other
than telecommunications, and special conditions (including interconnection
obligations) applicable to carriers determined by the Director General of
Telecommunications1 7 ("DGT") to have significant market power. The
incumbent British Telecom has a special license with additional conditions,
including accounting separation and local loop unbundling requirements
(imposed recently in light of disappointing results in achieving facilities-
based competition) and a prohibition on unfair cross-subsidies. Licenses
applicable to wireless services, granted by the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry and administered by the Radiocommunications Agency,
include technical standards for equipment and interference levels. Since
1998, fees for spectrum use can be set by regulation or by auction. As of
2001, the Radiocommunications Agency was developing proposals to
introduce spectrum trading. 1
8
Antitrust law 19 in the U.K. prohibits agreements or associations that
have the object or effect of preventing or distorting competition in a U.K.
market or of potentially affecting trade within the U.K. U.K. antitrust laws
also prohibit conduct that amounts to abuse of a dominant position and may
affect trade within the U.K. The antitrust laws may be enforced by the
Director General of Fair Trading, by the DGT, or by private action in court.
OFTEL has recently expressed an intention to relax some regulatory
requirements and to rely more extensively on its general powers to enforce
17. The DGT is the administrator of the Office of Telecommunications ("OFTEL"), the
United Kingdom's sector-specific regulatory agency.
18. Efforts to introduce spectrum trading in the U.K. have progressed since 2001. For
example, the Communications Act of 2003 expressly authorizes the promulgation of
regulations allowing the transfer of spectrum licenses and access rights. See
Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 168 (Eng.).
19. Many European, Australian and other policymakers and regulators outside the U.S.
use the term "competition law" to refer to laws and regulations described as "antitrust" in
the U.S. However, Geradin and Kerf use the term "antitrust law" throughout their book,
apparently for the sake of consistency. This review will do the same.
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the antitrust laws in order to regulate anticompetitive conduct in
telecommunications.
Geradin and Kerf make three significant observations about the U.K.
regulatory system. First, they note that although OFTEL initially focused
on promoting full facilities-based competition, those efforts were
disappointing. Accordingly, OFTEL has recently imposed requirements
(such as local loop unbundling) designed to accommodate non-facilities-
based competition as well. Second, in an age of convergence, inconsistent
decisions in the regulation of different network industries by different
institutions can lead to distortions in both capital and product markets. The
authors expected that a then-pending proposal to create a single regulator
for the entire communications industry (the Office of Communications or
"OFCOM") would help to promote greater coherence. 20 Third, it has been
difficult to ensure consistency in competition decisions where both the
antitrust regulator (the Director General of Fair Trading) and the
telecommunications regulator (OFTEL) have authority to enforce the
antitrust laws.2'
4. Chile
Sector-specific telecommunications rules in Chile are administered by
the Subsecretaria de Telecomunicaciones ("SUBTEL") within the Ministry
of Transport and Telecommunications. Pro-competitive, sector-specific
regulations were first adopted in the early 1980s and have evolved over
time to include such provisions as: (1) the award of licenses to provide
telecommunications services on a nondiscriminatory basis, (2) technical
standards and interconnection obligations, (3) price controls (for retail
services and interconnection) in insufficiently competitive markets,
(4) universal service obligations (phased in over time in areas lacking
sufficient infrastructure), (5) mandatory access to the customer's choice of
long-distance provider (through pre-selection and on a call-by-call basis),
and (6) competitive bidding for subsidized telecommunications deployment
projects in rural and low-income urban areas. Antitrust rules, which
generally prohibit actions or agreements that seek to hinder free
competition in economic activities and specifically prohibit the grant of
exclusive rights to perform any economic activity, are also applicable to
20. This proposal has since taken effect. The Office of Communications Act of 2002
established OFCOM, which will assume its full powers and responsibilities at the end of
2003. Office of Communications Act, 2002, c. 11 (Eng.). The Communications Act of 2003
assigned additional responsibilities to OFCOM. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, Pt. 1
(Eng.).
21. The Communications Act of 2003 resolved many of the problems arising from this
concurrent jurisdiction. See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, Pt. 5 (Eng.).
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telecommunications providers. The antitrust rules are administered by four
separate institutions, some national and some regional.
Geradin and Kerf are impressed with the levels of competition that
Chile has accomplished in its long-distance market, due in large part to
carrier pre-selection and dial-around access requirements. The mobile
market likewise has experienced growing competition, spurred by the grant
of multiple licenses in the same territories. Internet usage also has
increased significantly in recent years, probably due to price restrictions
imposed on the dominant local service provider. Finally, Chile has
achieved considerable success in deploying "universal service" (a single
operating payphone in previously unserved villages) on a cost-effective
basis pursuant to a competitive bidding mechanism. In the competitive
bidding procedure, the lowest-bidding carrier is awarded a nonexclusive
right to construct the payphones (using the cost-effective technology and
project design developed by the carrier) and receives the awarded subsidies
after completion of the facilities.
The authors generally support Chile's approach of allowing carriers
operating in one segment of the market to operate in other segments of the
market through separate subsidiaries and subject to prohibitions on cross-
subsidization. They also consider the overall regulatory model, particularly
the rule authorizing antitrust authorities to determine when market
conditions justify eliminating specific price regulations, to offer a good
compromise between coherence and specificity.
5. Australia
Policymakers adopting the current Australian telecommunications
regulatory regime were strongly influenced by an independent report on
competition policy issues, the 1993 Hilmer Report. The Hilmer Report
based many of its recommendations on a comparative analysis of other
regulatory regimes, particularly the New Zealand experience.
Under the current regime, general antitrust rules apply to
telecommunications carriers. In addition, the antitrust regulator, the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ("ACCC"),
administers a cross-sector access regime requiring access to infrastructure
facilities of certain services (pursuant to terms that are agreed upon by the
parties or arbitrated by the ACCC) where the Minister of Transport and
Communications makes the following determinations: (1) access to the
service would promote competition, (2) it would be uneconomical for
anyone to develop another facility to provide the service, (3) the facility is
of national significance, (4) access to the service can be provided without
undue risk to human health and safety, (5) an effective access regime is not
[Vol. 56
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already in place, and (6) access to the service is not contrary to the public
interest.
There are additional telecommunications sector-specific rules, but
most of these are incorporated into the antitrust legislation and
administered and implemented by the ACCC. Certain technical functions
are performed by a new regulatory body, the Australian Communications
Authority ("ACA"). The ACCC and ACA are required to cooperate in
some matters. Like Chile, Australia has introduced some measure of
competition for the provision of universal service through a program of
competitive bidding for access to a fund earmarked to provide service
outside the main cities.
Geradin and Kerf credit Australia with achieving varying levels of
success in promoting competition in the mobile market (spurred in part by
mobile number portability), the international services market, the dial-up
Internet market, and the broadband services market. However, the
incumbent Telstra continues to control most of the local and long-distance
markets. The authors also express concern about Australia's procedure for
mandating access to critical telecommunications facilities. They contend
that the processes for declaring services subject to access requirements and
for arbitrating appropriate terms of access are cumbersome and slow, and
that access prices may be set too low to allow the facilities' owners to
recoup their costs. More generally, however, the authors approve strongly
of the Australian approach of allocating the main responsibilities for
economic regulation of the telecommunications sector to a
telecommunications-specific department within a specialized cross-sector
regulator.
C. Comparative Analysis
Before stating their general conclusions, Geradin and Kerf discuss a
number of more specific telecommunications regulatory issues from a
comparative perspective, based on the experiences of the five countries
analyzed. For example, they examine the need for local loop unbundling to
promote local telephone competition; they evaluate interconnection pricing
regimes; and they recommend means for promoting universal service while
minimizing costs. More generally, Controlling Market Power reaches four
broad conclusions about the respective roles that should be played by
telecommunications sector-specific rules and institutions on the one hand,
and antitrust rules and institutions on the other hand, in regulating
telecommunications to control market power and promote competition and
efficiency.
First, the authors argue that the adoption of some sector-specific rules
is desirable when a country first attempts to open formerly monopolized
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telecommunications markets to competition. Desirable rules may include
an interconnection regime, local loop unbundling obligations, removal of
restrictions on resale, a guarantee of number portability and carrier pre-
selection, and the imposition of vertical separation between different
activities (such as wholesale and retail activities in the local loop). Sector-
specific rules (including price controls) may be necessary before
competition takes hold and to address telecommunications sector-specific
issues such as universal service and the allocation of scarce resources.
Second, even where sector-specific rules have been adopted, the
authors note that antitrust rules also must be applied to
telecommunications. Antitrust regulation can be used to review mergers
between telecommunications operators, to prohibit collusive practices
among competitors, and to prevent anticompetitive cross-subsidies between
regulated and nonregulated activities. Antitrust rules also help to fill gaps
in sector-specific regulatory regimes.
Third, the authors observe that implementation arrangements,
particularly the selection of the institution charged with overseeing
telecommunications regulation, are central to the effectiveness of the
regulatory regime. Specialized entities are needed to deal with the more
complex telecommunications regulatory issues, but economy-wide
regulatory bodies also offer some distinct advantages. According to
Controlling Market Power, the ideal solution may be to locate an
individual or entity with telecommunications expertise within the antitrust
regulatory body.
Fourth and finally, the authors conclude that there is growing
convergence between countries toward the adoption of some of the "best
practices" of telecommunications regulation identified in Controlling
Market Power. However, the authors admit that the degree of convergence
possible in telecommunications regulation is limited by the different policy
objectives and factual circumstances existent in different countries.
III. LESSONS ABOUT THE PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES
OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION
The scope of the comparative analysis undertaken in Controlling
Market Power is impressive, and the authors clearly have developed a
detailed and nuanced understanding of the markets, institutions and
regulatory regimes in the countries they evaluate. Moreover, many of their
observations and recommendations concerning specific regulatory issues
are insightful and useful. For example, the authors' recommendation (and
its underlying rationale) that responsibility for approving
telecommunications mergers in the United States be vested in the DOJ (the
[Vol. 56
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antitrust regulator), with input from the FCC (the sector-specific regulator),
could prove useful to U.S. lawmakers considering legislation to streamline
the review process for mergers in the telecommunications industry. 22 The
problem is that these focused and useful recommendations are buried in an
overly broad analysis that ends up offering general conclusions of limited
practical utility.
Geradin and Kerf themselves acknowledge that their book's broad
conclusions will not apply in many circumstances. Controlling Market
Power concludes with a warning that:
While many of the best practices identified above may be relevant for
different countries and while the arguments which have been
mentioned in favour or against specific regulatory choices should be
taken into account while determining the appropriate role of sector-
specific and economy-wide instruments in different contexts, specific
solutions will need to be carefully tailored to specific country
circumstances and policy objectives.23
Application of Controlling Market Power's broad institutional and
structural recommendations is particularly problematic for the policymaker
or practitioner of telecommunications law in the United States or other
countries with well-developed telecommunications regulatory models.
The greater utility and applicability of Geradin and Kerf's specific
recommendations, as opposed to their more general conclusions, offers an
important lesson about the use of comparative analysis in the
telecommunications regulatory arena: comparative analysis of
telecommunications regulation is most useful if conducted on a focused,
issue-specific basis rather than at a comprehensive, industry-wide level.
Where a more narrowly defined issue is being analyzed, the comparative
analysis can focus on countries that share similar circumstances (such as
market size, regulatory institutions and capabilities, and stage of
competitive development) and policy objectives relating to the issue at
hand. This approach ensures that only the most useful and relevant
information is gathered and examined. Thus, for example, the Chilean
experience in promoting universal service may not be particularly relevant
to efforts to reform the universal service system in the United States
because of the different levels of infrastructure deployment in the two
countries (which necessarily inform the countries' primary policy
objectives). On the other hand, U.S. regulators might be well-advised to
look to the Australian experience in implementing spectrum trading as they
attempt to promote the development of a secondary market for spectrum
22.See id. at 117.
23. CONTROLLING MARKET POWER, supra note 2, at 356.
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rights in the United States. 24 Similarly, U.S. policymakers seeking to
expand consumer access to broadband services could benefit
fromanalyzing the experiences of countries that have made significant
progress in deploying broadband Internet access.25
A proceeding currently pending before the FCC offers another
example of the circumstances in which a comparative investigation of other
countries' experience can be helpful. In that proceeding the FCC is
considering regulatory measures to promote competition in the market for
• 26
retail directory assistance services. Throughout the proceeding, U.S.
directory assistance providers, such as InfoNXX, Inc. (a U.S. wholesale
directory assistance provider that also offers retail directory assistance in
the U.K. through its subsidiary, The Number UK Ltd.), have urged the FCC
to look to the European experience as it determines appropriate measures to
promote competition in the U.S. market for retail directory assistance
services. 27 European countries are in many cases several years ahead of the
United States in introducing competition into this segment of the
telecommunications market. Similar to the New Zealand policymakers
discussed in Controlling Market Power, some European regulators have
taken initial steps, found the results unsatisfactory, and followed up with
modifications to the regulatory approach to more effectively accomplish
the policy objective of promoting competition in the provision of retail28
directory assistance services. Under these circumstances, where the
policy objectives in the countries being considered are the same and
important similarities existed in the structure of the different countries'
markets prior to the introduction of competition, a comparative analysis of
the European experience could provide valuable information that could
help the FCC avoid the kinds of regulatory mistakes that some European
regulators made in their early attempts to promote retail directory
assistance competition.
24. Although New Zealand also has attempted to implement spectrum trading, the New
Zealand experience would be less relevant to the United States because the New Zealand
market is so much smaller than the U.S. market.
25. Indeed, members of the FCC staff have already initiated such an inquiry. See
SHERILLE ISMAIL AND IRENE Wu, FCC, BROADBAND INTERNET AcCESS IN OECD COUNTRIES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Oct. 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/
attachmatch/DOC-239660A2.pdf.
26. See Provision of Directory Listing Info. Under the Comm. Act of 1934, As
Amended, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 1164 (2002).
27. See, e.g., Ex Parte Letter of InfoNXX, Inc., CC Docket No. 99-273 (Sept. 25,
2003); Ex Parte Letter of InfoNXX, Inc., CC Docket No. 99-273 (May 21, 2003);
Comments of Telegate, Inc., CC Docket No. 99-273, at 4-18 (Apr. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Telegate Comments].




Controlling Market Power makes an important contribution to the
field of comparative analysis of telecommunications regulation. The book
offers an impressively comprehensive and detailed comparative analysis of
five significant telecommunications regulatory models. In some respects,
the undertaking of Controlling Market Power is overambitious, resulting in
a book that is long and complex without, in the end, offering many broadly
applicable conclusions of much practical significance. On the other hand,
as the above examples show, the book does offer useful regulatory
recommendations on specific issues while teaching important lessons about
the value of comparative analysis of telecommunications regulation in
appropriate circumstances. Particularly in the telecommunications arena,
where regulatory issues can be complex and without precedent in other
industries, a comparative investigation of similar regulatory initiatives in
countries with similar factual circumstances and policy objectives can help
regulators to avoid the kind of regulatory mistakes that impose significant
costs on industry, consumers, and the economy as a whole.
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